I have hope. Is that misplaced?

Sometimes this blog receives comments which deserve space to breathe.  This one is from an old friend of mine: Pascal Piazza and I met on the first day of the 9th grade, at our alphabetically-assigned lockers in the hall of the 300 building of Houston’s George W. Strake Memorial Jesuit College Preparatory for Young Christian Gentlemen (which, of course, we were).  Since then he became a respected lawyer, and has been admitted to practice in all Texas courts including the state’s supreme court, the Supreme Court of the United States and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and enough federal district courts and bankruptcy courts in this part of the world to make your eyes bug out.  He’s been generally and repeatedly frustrated by some actions and inactions of the Supremes in recent cases (you’ll recognize which ones), and finally took it out on his keyboard.  PR

To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

As a citizen, a retired attorney of 40 years, and a native Texan, I adopt the personal privilege to comment, in a colloquial manner, on two potentially very divisive issues which, when resolved by the application of the plain text of the Joint Resolution Annexing the State of Texas and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, respectively, need not be divisive and will restore the rule of law.  Both issues are easy to decide.  The parties may try to complicate them, but y’all can follow the easy, established, and time-honored path.

It’s About the Joint Resolution Annexing the State of Texas.

You will be asked by attorneys acting for the Governor of Texas to allow Texas to implement certain means (e.g., installing razor wire or deploying roving private militias) to try to prevent undocumented persons from crossing into Texas through its southern border of the Rio Grande, and further to prevent the U.S. from entering land along that border or to interfere with or remove the mitigating means, solely on the grounds of Texas’s perceived “right of public defense.”  Curiously, y’all will be asked to rule on this issue by the same Texas officials who’ve already suggested they don’t have to comply with any of your rulings that they do not like, because they elevate their perception of the sovereignty of Texas over all else.  There is, however, no need for the issue of Texas’s perceived right of public defense to escalate into accelerating tensions, to revive the nullification doctrine, or to precipitate something worse.  Instead, y’all sit at the forefront to show that Texas, like all states and persons, has the right to redress in the courts under the rule of law, and to remind the state that Texans are known for living up to their word of honor regardless of party affiliation or political persuasion.  Y’all have an easy task before you; only you can make it difficult.  Here’s a path to the easy way instead of the hard way.

The U.S. and Texas, by mutual consent, defined the right of public defense back in 1845, at the time the U.S. annexed Texas by means of a joint resolution of the U.S. Congress which was accepted by the Republic of Texas.  That right of public defense was an integral part of the unambiguous text of annexation.  Y’all need only follow that text without gloss.

Joint ResolutionThe text of the Joint Resolution Annexing Texas to the United States provides that Texas cedes to the U.S. “…all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, ports and harbors, navy and navy-yards, docks, magazines, arms, armaments, and all other property and means pertaining to the public defence belonging to said Republic of Texas.” [Emphasis added]  It does not say that Texas cedes “all other property and means pertaining to the public defence” only when Texas agrees with federal policy.  It does not state that Texas can craft its own public defense.  Texas was not given a veto power.  Texas was not given a right to repudiate or breach the plain terms, which vest all property and means pertaining to public defense to the U.S., whether listed or not.  Texas consented to these terms.

Let’s then give these words their plain meaning.  When it comes to providing for the public defense, the U.S. solely may determine whether to install razor wire or take it down, whether to use mobile militias or not, whether to enter the lands along the border or not, where or how to intercept persons crossing the border, whether to administer medical care or not, and whether to implement or pursue particular actions that Texas wants pursued.  You resolve this issue by giving effect to the plain text and thereby ensuring the fully intentional, consented-to, and coordinated sovereignty of Texas and the U.S.

There is no need to look beyond that plain text defining the public defense.  But the plain text of the remainder of the sentence defining the public defense affirms that the exclusive grant to the U.S. was intentional and was an essential part of the unique compromise that secured the required votes for passage of the Joint Resolution for Annexation after the prior Treaty for Annexation never could be ratified by the Senate.  Texas exclusively granted the U.S. the means and property rights for public defense in exchange for Texas keeping its public lands (and what would be multiple millions of dollars in oil and gas royalties) to pay off its debts.  Texas is the only state that was allowed to keep its public lands.  The U.S. gave up ownership of the public lands in Texas.  Those lands would yield multi-millions of dollars in revenue from the oil and gas found there.  Those lands could be sold off generating significant revenues, as was the practice in 19th century America.  President Polk won election over Henry Clay in 1844 based upon his vision of westward expansion into the valuable lands of Texas, which he felt had been squandered by Spain and then Mexico.  The U.S. received the right of public defense in exchange.  That is what is at issue now.

The then-new state of Texas understood the plain meaning.  I understand that the parties to an agreement cannot define meaning by how they perceive the meaning, but the first post-annexation Texas Constitution instructs y’all that Texas understood that the plain terms mean what the plain terms mean.  That constitution confirmed that the sovereignty of Texas over its soil was secure, except for what it ceded in the Joint Resolution for Annexation or otherwise in the U.S. Constitution.  It knew that the property and means of public defense, by consent, vested in the U.S.

Therefore, under the text of the Joint Resolution for Annexation, Texas occupies a unique position.  It should now – as all true Texans do – stand on its word, even if it is a handshake deal.  Of course, there is much more here than just a handshake.

Y’all will hear that Texas has some natural or inherent right of public defense.  Regardless of whether such a right does or does not exist, Texas ceded it to the U.S. when the state was annexed in 1845.

Y’all may then ask whether Article I, Section 10, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution grants Texas some right of public defense in case it is ever invaded, whether the U.S. consents at the time or not.  Well, under Texas’s unique position, the text of the Joint Resolution for Annexation still is the starting point.  In addition, the text of Article I, Section 10, clause 3 does not mention public defense, does not mention any of the means that Texas wants to implement or adopt, does not provide that Texas can exclude the U.S. from areas occupied by Texas, does not provide that Texas can interfere with the conduct of the U.S., and does not permit Texas to breach the compromise (which a true Texan would never do).  Texas appears before y’all bound by its agreement and by the consent of Texas and the U.S. as to how the public defense plays out.  Today, Texas assumes that this is a situation where there is no consent by the U.S., yet Texas and the U.S. consented in 1845 for the U.S. to have exclusive power over public defense, whether there is an invasion or not.  Texas cannot repudiate that consent to try to go back on its word.

Some have even suggested that Texas would never have entered the Union had it known, or could have foreseen, that it did not preserve a right of public defense or could not use all land and other means for public defense.  Well, that’s what Texas did – in writing.  In Texas, we stand on our word.

It’s About the Eligibility Requirements in the U.S. Constitution

Let’s start by applying the text of the 14th Amendment as written.  Do not apply some theory of construction.  Do not apply fears of political reprisals.  Do not adopt a result and then read the words to yield your desired result.  It does not make a difference who may be ruled eligible or ineligible.  If the issue were the age of the candidate in question, you would consider only the text; y’all would not consider who the candidate is or whether your ruling would upset or even enrage the masses.

This led me to read opinions offered by distinguished retired federal judges covering the entire political spectrum based upon the text of the 14th Amendment.  How is it that these numerous distinguished federal district court judges have followed the text and find that the 14th Amendment does apply to determine eligibility?  The answer is that they followed the plain text.  Your questions to the parties during oral arguments last week indicate y’all may not agree with those opinions; I hope that your questions were meant to test the attorneys, and do not reflect your belief of what the plain text actually means.

Some advocates will claim that the president, whose position is defined in the U.S. Constitution, is not an “officer.”  However, the U.S. Constitution, at Article II, Section 1, states that the executive powers shall be vested in the president who holds his office over a four-year term.  The dictionary defines an officer as one who holds an office.  Therefore, the president is an officer as he holds the office of the president.  Yet, some of your questions indicated that you may have a problem accepting this syllogism.  Hopefully, you exercised your right during questioning during oral argument to test ideas rather than reveal your own conclusions.  The text of the 14th Amendment covers a person seeking to be “… a Senator or Representative in Congress, or an elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States.”  [Emphasis added]  The text, therefore, covers one who seeks to hold a federal office which, constitutionally, includes someone wanting to be the president.  This wording in the 14th Amendment does not amend the other Constitutional text that defines the president as the holder of an office (i.e., an officer).

Y’all selectively like to cite portions of the Federalist Papers or other outside writings of the Framers to try to change the otherwise unambiguous meaning of the text of the Constitution.  Please stick to the text when it is unambiguous, as in the case of the 14th Amendment, so that the inquiry ends there.  The other words of the Framers are interesting historically and allow us now to assess how brilliant they were, but those words do not comprise the text of the U.S. Constitution.  It is the text of the Constitution that matters, not what any Framer may have wanted to include in the text but failed to win approval for.  Y’all cannot import into the text of the Constitution any words which the Framers failed to include.

Public policy cannot be the tail that wags the jurisprudential dog.  If you want to make policy, then run for office.  Otherwise, honor your oath.  Your failure to honor your oath will cause more dissension and disruption to this country than following the text.  I was taught on the first day of my Constitutional Law class that y’all like to make public policy.  Just because y’all have done it before does not justify doing it anymore.

Some advocates have asked questions about states trying to impose requirements on the federal election.  Colorado and Maine are simply applying the eligibility requirements as they already exist in the U.S. Constitution.  They could do it, and have done it, regarding the minimum age to be the president.  I again hope you were just asking questions during oral argument and not revealing your conclusions when there was a perceived concern for the states trying to impose state requirements on a federal election.

A majority of the Justices currently claim that unstated rights and conditions may not be imported into the text.  So, where is the textual basis to claim that the 14th Amendment’s eligibility threshold requires Congressional action?  One opinion by one U.S. Supreme Court justice sitting as a circuit judge does not make a consensus or anything but one opinion.

The same majority of Justices also currently claim that the text of the U.S. Constitution, including the 14th Amendment, must be construed based upon the meaning of words in 1787 and 1868, respectively.  If so, the consensus of distinguished historians is that the 14th Amendment does apply as Colorado and Maine have held.  Y’all can’t ask to consult history but then reject the consensus of historians.  Y’all still should just stick to the unambiguous text.

Some advocates feign the downfall of judicial process through a fear of a multiplicity of state-based lawsuits if states seek to apply the text of the 14th Amendment.  So, does this mean that states should not seek to enforce the text of the U.S. Constitution when it applies to the duties of the states?  Could not the states seek to enforce the minimum age eligibility requirement?  When did filing suits seeking to apply the 14th Amendment become a bad thing?  Under this argument, should former Vice President Pence not have certified the last presidential election results because it led to 60 some-odd lawsuits?

Thank you.

–Pascal Paul Piazza

Courting trouble for the former guy

Former President I Will Not Be Ignored got a little more of what he’s been begging for yesterday: attention from our nation’s judicial system.  In response to his ridiculous-on-its-face insistence that former presidents enjoy lifelong complete criminal immunity from prosecution for actions taken while in office, lest they be indicted by forces of the opposing party the instant they leave office, a federal appeals court panel ruled – unanimously – that he is off his rocker.  Essentially.  In a legal sense.

At public arguments in January, the three judges expressed concern over the most extreme implications of Trump’s view, with one suggesting it would allow a future president to order the assassination of a political rival. But in their opinion Tuesday, they said it is Trump’s own alleged crimes — “an unprecedented assault on the structure of our government” — that threaten democracy if left beyond the reach of criminal prosecution.

“We cannot accept former President Trump’s claim that a President has unbounded authority to commit crimes that would neutralize the most fundamental check on executive power — the recognition and implementation of election results,” the judges wrote. “Nor can we sanction his apparent contention that the Executive has carte blanche to violate the rights of individual citizens to vote and to have their votes count.”

When he “warns” that all political parties would legally attack former leaders from other parties if those leaders did not enjoy legal protection, it’s a textbook example of the projection associated with his narcissism: in fact, such a thing has never happened in the past, but it is something that he himself has already promised he will do if he becomes president again next year.  This case could still go to the Supreme Court; we will know within weeks.  But we do know that the Supremes will be hearing a Trump case tomorrow, a case over his Constitutional eligibility to ever become president again.

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on Thursday in what is shaping up to be the biggest election case since its ruling nearly 25 years ago in Bush v. Gore. At issue is whether former President Donald Trump, who is once again the front runner for the Republican nomination for president, can be excluded from the ballot because of his role in the Jan. 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Capitol. 

Although the question comes to the court in a case from Colorado, the impact of the court’s ruling could be much more far-reaching. Maine’s secretary of state ruled in December that Trump should be taken off the primary ballot there, and challenges to Trump’s eligibility are currently pending in 11 other states. Trump warns that the efforts to keep him off the ballot “threaten to disenfranchise tens of millions of Americans” and “promise to unleash chaos and bedlam if other state courts and state officials follow Colorado’s lead.” But the voters challenging Trump’s eligibility counter that “we already saw the ‘bedlam’ Trump unleashed when he was on the ballot and lost.”

At issue is a section of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, approved in the years following the Civil War to prevent former rebels from entering government and continuing their rebellion.  Paraphrasing here, it prohibits anyone who’d previously been a U.S. government official, and then later “engaged in insurrection or rebellion” against the Constitution, from later serving in government again.  Pretty sensible, right?  In other words, among the requirements to be president, one must be at least 35 years old and not have previously been a traitor.

Trump’s arguments that the 14th Amendment doesn’t apply to him are from the same book as his “presidents need to be able to commit crimes with impunity” arguments in the immunity case he’s currently losing.

Trump’s first, and main, argument is that Section 3 does not apply to him because the president is not an “officer of the United States.” In other provisions of the Constitution where the phrase “officer of the United States” appears, Trump notes, it does not apply to the president – for example, the clause that requires the president to “Commission all the Officers of the United States” and the impeachment clause, which lists the president and vice president separately from “civil Officers of the United States.” Moreover, Trump adds, the Supreme Court in 2010 indicated that the phrase applies only to federal officials who are appointed; it does not extend to elected officials like the president.

The voters dismiss this argument, countering that the president has been called the “chief executive officer of the United States” since long before the 14th Amendment was drafted. As with the phrase “office under the United States,” they say, Section 3 simply uses the phrase “of the United States” to distinguish between federal offices, such as the presidency, and state officers.

The voters also discount Trump’s reliance on other provisions of the Constitution. They note that although the appointments clause requires the president to appoint some “officers of the United States,” it also indicates that the Constitution provides for the appointment of other “officers of the United States” – including the president and vice president – by the electoral college. And the impeachment clause, they reason, provides for the impeachment of the president and vice president separately from “all civil Officers of the United States” because (unlike other officials) the president and vice president play both civil and military roles.

Section 3 also does not apply to him, Trump continues, because when he is sworn in the president pledges to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” – rather than “support” it, as Section 3 requires.

The voters contend, however, that “Section 3 is about violation of a sworn duty, not about pedantic wordplay.” The oath that the president takes to “preserve, protect and defend” the Constitution is an oath to support the Constitution, they insist.

The voters add that an interpretation of Section 3 that excludes the president, while still applying to all other officials – including “postmaster or county sheriff” – who took an oath to support the Constitution and then engaged in insurrection would be at odds with the purpose of the provision. Moreover, they suggest, it would be an exception that would apply only to Trump, because “every other President (except, of course, George Washington) had previously sworn a constitutional oath in some other federal or state capacity.”

Trump pushes back against any suggestion that it would be inconsistent with the purpose of Section 3 to hold that the president falls outside its scope. When the 14th Amendment was ratified, he contends, there weren’t any former presidents who had supported the Confederacy, so the drafters would not have had any reason to exclude the president from serving again.

There are a couple of schools of thought among Never Trumpers and other reasonable people: is it better to invoke the Constitution to keep the former guy from being on the ballot for president this year and not take a chance that he wins, or just let the election runs its course and have him suffer electoral defeat?  Of course, we’ve seen what happens when he loses an election fair and square, and we’ve seen what happens when he wins.  I found E.J. Dionne’s argument of how his mind has changed on this question to be persuasive.

Though I agreed that Trump had, indeed, engaged in insurrection, I thought it would be best for the country to have him go down to defeat again in a free and fair election. Keeping him on the ballot so voters could decide was the path to long-term institutional stability and might finally force a reckoning in the Republican Party.

Many people I respect continue to hold versions of this view. But the more I read and listened, the clearer it became that Section 3 was directed against precisely the conduct Trump engaged in. [Emphasis added] Its purpose is to protect the republic from those who would shred the Constitution and destroy our system of self-government. What Trump did in advance of the attack on the Capitol and on Jan. 6, 2021, legally disqualifies him from the presidency.

The record is clear that the legislators who wrote and enacted the amendment in the wake of the Civil War were not just thinking of the Confederacy’s leaders but also of “the leaders of any rebellion hereafter to come.”

Those are the words of John B. Henderson, a Republican senator from Missouri, when he cast his vote for the amendment in 1866. They are recorded in a powerful amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court by a distinguished group of historians of the era: Jill Lepore, David Blight, Drew Gilpin Faust and John Fabian Witt.

The amendment’s authors, they argue, “hoped not only to prevent a resurgence of secessionism but also to protect future generations against insurrectionism.” It was intended “to bar anyone who has betrayed an oath to uphold the Constitution from becoming President of the United States.”

(snip)

And to argue that barring Trump from the ballot is “antidemocratic,” wrote professors Carol Anderson and Ian Farrell in another brief, is “ironic … as he bears by far the most responsibility for attempting to subvert democracy on Jan. 6.” An effort to overthrow constitutional procedures, wrote [Sherrilyn] Ifill, should be distinguished from political protests, even those “accompanied by sporadic acts of violence.” Demonstrators are not the same as a mob trying to hijack the government.

(snip)

Throwing Trump off the ballot would seem, on its face, the opposite of democracy. Yet the whole point of Section 3 is to protect constitutional democracy from anyone who has already tried to destroy it. If its provisions don’t apply to Trump, they don’t apply to anyone. The court would not be disqualifying him. He disqualified himself.

The court convenes at 10 a.m. ET tomorrow; you can listen live to the arguments here or download the clip later.

ALSO: The Washington Post’s Aaron Blake with insight into the damage done to Trump by the loss in his immunity claim case.